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I show that in a conventional Ramsey model, between one-fourth and one-half of income 
differences across countries can be explained by a single factor: The steady-state effect of 
large, persistent differences in national average IQ on worker productivity.  These 
differences in cognitive ability--which are well-supported in the psychology literature--
are likely to be malleable through better nutrition, better education, and better health care 
in the world’s poorest countries.  A simple calibration exercise in the spirit of Bils and 
Klenow (2000) and Castro (2005) is conducted.  A move from the bottom decile of the 
global IQ distribution to the top decile will cause steady-state living standards to rise by 
between 75 and 350 percent.  I provide evidence that little of the IQ-productivity 
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applies.   In this paper, I contend that between one-fourth and one-half of income 
differences across countries can be explained by a single factor: The effect of large, 
persistent differences in average national IQ on labor productivity.  These differences in 
cognitive ability--which are well-supported in the psychology literature--are likely to be 
malleable through better nutrition, better education, and better health care in the world’s 
poorest countries.   
  I arrive at this result through a short chain of reasoning: labor econometricians 
have shown that higher IQ causes higher wages (inter alia, Bowles, Gintis, and Osborne  
(2001), Cawley, Conneely, Heckman, and Vytlacil (1997), Zax and Rees (2002), Neal 
and Johnson (1996), and developing country estimates cited in Behrman et al., (2004)).  
In competitive markets, the reason for this higher wage is because higher IQ raises labor 
productivity.  Finally, in a conventional Ramsey growth model, anything that raises labor 
productivity raises the steady-state capital-labor ratio, thus leading to a multiplier effect 
of IQ on labor productivity.   
  Formalizing this chain of thought within a quantitative general equilibrium 
setting, I use microeconometric estimates of IQ’s impact on the marginal product of labor 
along with macroeconomic estimates of the elasticity of output with respect to capital to 
calibrate a simple Ramsey model of a nation’s economy.  This methodology takes into 
account the possibility of reverse causality, and in this respect is similar to Bils and 
Klenow (2000), who focused on the possibility of reverse causality in the cross-country 
education-growth relationship.  My use of calibration in a cross-country setting is similar 
to (though simpler than) the innovative work of Castro (2005).   
  1  The theoretical model calibrated here helps explain why previous researchers 
(Lynn and Vanhanen (2002), Weede and Kampf (2002), Weede (2004), Jones and 
Schneider (2004)) have found strong statistical relationships between national average IQ 
and economic performance.  For reference, I note that the simple correlation between log 
year 2000 output per worker and national average IQ (as measured by the Penn World 
Tables and Lynn and Vanhanen (2002), respectively) is 0.82 (Figure 1).  
Multivariate tests have repeatedly demonstrated that this relationship between 
national average IQ and economic performance is robust (though see Volken (2003) and 
Nechbya (2004) for contrary views).  For example, Jones and Schneider found that in 
1330 Solow-style growth regressions that included only robust control variables, national 
average IQ was statistically significant in 99.8% of these regressions, and positive in 
100% of these regressions; further, they found that IQ easily passed the Bayesian model 
averaging robustness test proposed by Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004).   
IQ’s correlation with cross-country differences in productivity and productivity 
growth demands a theoretical explanation: This calibration exercise is the beginning of 
such an explanation.  The results presented here imply that depending on the capital 
elasticity of output parameter, a move from the bottom decile of the global IQ 
distribution to the top decile will cause a rise in steady-state living standards of between 
75 and 350 percent.  I close by discussing the opportunities for macroeconomists to 




  2The Relative Reliability of IQ 
  The crucial question in this line of inquiry is whether cross-country IQ measures 
are generally reliable.  A large line of research in the psychology literature, going back 
for a hundred years and summarized in Lynn and Vanhanen (2002) demonstrates that 
when using best-practice psychometric methods, they generally are.  After discussing IQ 
tests in general, I will then discuss cross-country and non-verbal IQ tests.  
Tests of general cognitive ability--which I will refer to as IQ (Intelligence 
Quotient) tests--were originally developed for the Paris school system by Alfred Binet in 
1908.  Binet’s tests were quickly found to be useful in identifying mentally retarded 
children (Jensen (1998), 15).  IQ tests have had this practical orientation ever since: They 
are used by schools to place students, and they are widely used by the U.S. military to 
allocate human resources efficiently (Jensen (1998), 282ff.).      
In addition, IQ tests are heavily used by firms to hire and promote (Cascio (2003), 
250-251), and so it appears that such tests are a valuable source of information for firms 
about the quality of job applicants.  In a meta-analysis reported in Cascio’s (2003, 252) 
widely-used human resources text, such “general mental ability tests” are tied for third 
out of 19 predictors of job performance, ranking behind actual work samples and tied 
with structured employment interviews for statistical validity.   
The validity of IQ tests in work settings is unambiguous.  These scores correlate 
0.3 to 0.5 with assessments of worker performance by managers—and are higher when 
job performance can be measured objectively or when the work tasks are more difficult 
(Gottfredson (1997)).  Additionally, a well-known finding in the labor economics 
literature is that IQ tests taken at an early age have strong predictive power for wages 
  3later in life, even if the test is taken long before a person’s education is complete (inter 
alia, Neal and Johnson (1996), Zax and Rees (2002).  For example, as we see below, Zax 
and Rees find that high school IQ scores have a larger impact on wages when a worker is 
in his fifties than when the same worker is in his thirties.  And as I demonstrate below, 
the link between cognitive ability and wages is an extremely robust finding among labor 
econometricians.   
In the last two decades, psychologists have started to investigate how IQ is 
correlated with brain activity.  To give one example: An experimenter flashes a bright 
light in front of a subject’s eyes and measures the speed with which that message is 
conducted to the vision centers at the back of the brain.  This simple measure of nerve 
conduction velocity is correlated +0.37 with IQ after correction for restriction of range 
(Jensen (1998), 160ff).   
Another example: IQ is correlated by between –0.7 and –0.8 with cerebral glucose 
metabolism (Haier, (1993), Jensen (1998) 157ff).  This sugar-burning process is 
measured using a PET scan while the test subject is trying to answer the most difficult 
questions on the IQ test.  This implies a quite astonishing result:  Lower-IQ individuals 
are generally trying harder than higher-IQ individuals to solve the hard questions.  If one 
believed that IQ differences across individuals were largely driven by social norms in 
favor of “trying hard” in some groups but not in others, one would expect a positive 
correlation between IQ and cerebral glucose metabolism.  The nerve conduction velocity 
results and the cerebral glucose metabolism results both support the view that high-IQ 
individuals have brains that are, on average, more efficient processors of information.   
  4The possibility of studying a key determinant of productivity through brain 
imaging has important consequences for economists.  As microeconomists and financial 
economists have begun to use brain imaging techniques to study individual 
decisionmaking--creating the new field of neuroeconomics--it may be time for 
macroeconomists and productivity researchers to consider similar methods.   
One can repeat a number of other examples where objective brain measures are 
correlated with IQ tests; Jensen (1998, 150-165) is especially useful in this regard.  
However, these brain activity measures have not to my knowledge been conducted in 
poor countries, so they shed limited light on whether IQ comparisons from across 
countries are measuring the same differences that have been found within countries.   
Thus, I turn to the Jensen Box.  Jensen created a simple test of information 
processing speed that has been widely used by psychologists interested in intelligence 
testing.  The Jensen box has a home button and between 1 and 8 buttons with lights.  
Initially, all of the buttons with lights are turned off.  When one of the buttons with lights 
turns on, the test subject takes her finger off the home button and presses the lighted 
button as quickly as possible.  One might expect that this skill is uncorrelated with IQ, 
but in fact button-pressing speed (known as reaction time) is correlated by an average of 
–0.35 (Jensen (1998), 204).  The correlation is higher when there are more buttons to 
choose from.   
Again, one might believe that this correlation simply results from social norms 
and acculturation: People who try harder on IQ tests might also be people who try harder 
on button-pressing tests.  But if that is the case, it is difficult to explain the following fact: 
The correlation between reaction time and IQ derives almost entirely from the speed with 
  5which one lifts one’s finger from the home button (a measure known as decision time).  
There is little if any correlation between movement time (the time between finger 
removal and the time when the lighted button is depressed) and IQ (Jensen (1998), 211-
214, 230-231, 242).  Again, IQ seems to be correlated with information processing speed 
(For another review of Jensen Box research, see Deary (2003)).   
A natural question is whether this strong correlation between decision time and IQ 
holds outside the United States.  Psychologist Richard Lynn and his coauthors conducted 
a series of studies in the U.S., Britain, Ireland, Japan, and South Africa to see if the 
correlation between IQ and decision time held across these countries (reviewed in Lynn 
and Vanhanen (2002), 66ff).  In studies of hundreds of 9-year olds using non-verbal IQ 
tests, they found that it did.  Aggregating to one observation per country, the correlation 
between national average IQ and national average decision time was always greater than 
0.89, regardless of the type of Jensen Box test.  The Jensen Box thus appears to verify the 
value of IQ tests as a measure of information processing speed, a factor that seems likely 
to influence worker productivity.  
This brings us to the question of cross-cultural and nonverbal IQ tests.  Because 
IQ tests are in such demand among educators, businesses, and governments around the 
world, psychologists have responded by supplying a wide variety of such tests.  When a 
new test is created, its validity is verified by giving both the new and the old test to the 
same group of people.  Further, since the early 1970’s, psychologists have responded 
aggressively to claims that IQ tests were culturally biased in favor of affluent people of 
European descent.  Since the 1980’s, there have been no noticeable differences in the 
validity of IQ tests across racial groups in the U.S.  That is, these tests predict non-test 
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in depth, Jensen ((1998), 360-369) can point the interested reader toward much of the 
relevant literature.   
Of course, one often wants to give IQ tests to children, people who have not 
learned to read, and people for whom IQ tests do not exist in their language.  Non-verbal 
IQ tests are widely used, such as Catell’s Culture-Fair test, Raven’s Progressive Matrices, 
and the Draw-A-Man test.  Let us consider the Raven test, since its matrices are a 
statistically powerful predictor of overall IQ scores, and since similar matrices are part of 
a conventional IQ test.  One is given three visual objects with something in common--a 
triangle, a square, and a pentagon, perhaps--and is given a set of choices that can 
complete the pattern--four objects, one of which is a hexagon.  The patterns one is 
looking for may include colors, straight lines, complex designs, and the like.  For a 
literate person, scores on the matrices section are heavily correlated with overall IQ as 
measured via a traditional test--indeed, scores on these matrix-style tests often have the 
highest correlation with overall mental ability (inter alia, Jensen, (1998), 34-38).  Thus, if 
one had to choose just one portion of an IQ test to give, the matrices section would be a 
reasonable choice.  Accordingly, non-verbal IQ tests such as the Raven play a central role 
in modern IQ testing.  
This completes our brief survey of the validity of cross-cultural IQ tests.  For the 
reader interested in the overall validity of IQ tests, Jensen (1998) is highly recommended, 
as is Lynn and Vanhanen (2002, c. 6) on the question of the cross-national validity of IQ 
tests.   
   
  7 
Environmental Effects on IQ 
  All major psychological researchers agree that the environment has a major 
impact on a person’s IQ.  And while social forces are an important part of a person’s 
environment, “environment” encompasses far more than just social forces.  Factors such 
as childhood caloric intake, lead and mercury exposure, micronutrient levels, and prenatal 
maternal health can all have sizeable impacts on IQ.    
  Leading economists have been convinced of the impact of health and nutrition on 
IQ.  The Copenhagen Consensus project--a panel of prominent economists that included 
three Nobel laureates--evaluated the costs and benefits of various proposals to improve 
the well-being of the world’s poor (Lomborg (2004)).  Their second-highest-ranked 
recommendation was to include key micronutrients--vitamin and mineral supplements--in 
the food supply of the world’s poorest countries.  The impact of nutrition on IQ figured 
prominently in the arguments in favor the micronutrient policy.   
  For example, the “challenge paper” on health and nutrition that was presented to 
the Consensus panelists points to research showing that low-birth-weight babies have 
IQ’s that are roughly 7 points lower than that of full-weight children (Behrman et al., 
2004).  They also point to research showing that iodine deficiency can reduce IQ by 13.5 
IQ points, and that iron deficiency can reduce IQ by 7.5 points.  Overall, Behrman et al.’s 
paper to the Copenhagen Consensus panel had 54 references to the word “cognitive” and 
10 references to “IQ.”  The prominence of IQ in their micronutrient challenge paper and 
the high ranking given to the micronutrient initiative by the Copenhagen Consensus 
participants demonstrate that leading thinkers are convinced that the brain health of the 
  8world’s poorest people is a substantial “barrier to riches” in the sense of Parente and 
Prescott (2004).   
  In addition, lead poisoning is a well-known cause of lower IQ’s in the U.S., but 
this is also a problem around the world, particularly in Africa, where leaded gasoline is 
still widely used (Lacey (2004)).  As the Global Lead Network (2005) notes, “Africa is 
more severely affected by lead poisoning and pollution than any other region of the 
world. Virtually all countries on the continent still use leaded gasoline in opposition to 
global trends - and the lead content of that gasoline is the highest in the world.”     
  The possible impact of education on IQ should be noted: While estimates of 
education’s impact on IQ vary, Winship and Korenman (1997) survey the literature of 
U.S. and Scandanavian studies—which include some natural experiments—and also 
perform their own analyses of the U.S. National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth. An 
additional year of education is estimated to raise IQ by anywhere from 1.0 to 4.2 IQ 
points according to their literature survey.  In their own regressions, point estimates range 
from 1.8 to 2.7 IQ points per year of education depending on the specification.  Neal and 
Johnson (1996), using quarter-of-birth as an instrument for exogenous education, find 
estimates toward the upper end of these ranges.  So the malleability of IQ through 
education appears to be an important channel for raising national average IQ.   
  This just touches on the massive literature demonstrating how environmental 
forces can impact national average IQ.  For further references on the effects of the 
environment on IQ, Jensen (1998, pps 489-509), Sternberg and Grigorenko (2001), and 
Armor (2003) are especially useful.  This body of literature gives hope that the large IQ 
  9differences that exist between countries can be narrowed in the future through 
environmental improvements.     
 
IQ in the Production Function 
  To begin a discussion of IQ in the Ramsey model, I begin by assuming an IQ-
augmented Cobb-Douglas production function,   




The subscript i is the country subscript, and γ is the semi-elasticity of output with respect 
to IQ (Since my concern is with steady-states, I suppress time subscripts wherever 
possible).  Below, I show that the labor economics literature implies precisely this form 
for the role of IQ in the production function.  Note that national average IQ is implicitly a 
component of total factor productivity. 
As in Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) I assume that ln(Ait)=   i gt a ε + + , 
implying a one-time country-specific shock to the level of technology; gt represents the 
time trend in technology assumed constant across all countries.  Mankiw et al. assume 
that εi was uncorrelated with any other parameter in the model; I relax this assumption by 
assuming only that εi has mean zero and is possibly correlated with IQ.  Thus, all 
countries have access to the same global stock of knowledge, plus or minus a country-
specific shock to the level of technology. 
Since in competitive markets (without externalities) labor and capital earn their 
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In this section, it is the real wage that concerns us.  I take logs and simplify:  
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  The first term of equation (2) notes that a one-point increase in IQ raises the real 
wage by γ percent.  Fortunately for our purposes, there is large literature in labor 
economics devoted to estimating γ: The exogenous impact of a rise in IQ (often referred 
to as cognitive ability) on the log of real wages.  I survey this literature below.   
In light of equation (2), I can now explain why I allow the possibility of a 
correlation between A (often thought of as disembodied technology) and IQ.  The focus 
of this paper is on one particular channel through which IQ impacts output per worker: by 
raising the private marginal product of labor.  IQ surely impacts productivity through 
other channels—human capital spillovers come immediately to mind, and it seems quite 
plausible that the level of IQ has important impacts on the rate of technological 
innovation and technology adoption.   
Further, the relationship may run in exactly the opposite direction: From higher 
productivity to higher IQ, perhaps by way of better nutrition, more stimulating 
educational environments, and the like.  The productivity-to-IQ causal chain should be 
kept in mind as a real possibility, since rich countries tend to have healthier, better-
educated populations: these would be just the types of populations that would be 
expected to perform well on IQ tests.  Our simple calibration exercise allows us to 
  11separate out the γ impact (of IQ on output via worker productivity) from any other 
possible channel through which IQ and productivity could be related.   
Therefore, one should keep in mind that of the many possible reasons for the high 
unconditional correlation (0.82) between national average IQ and log worker 
productivity, I explore only one possible channel in this paper.  If this strong relationship 
cannot be explained by the channel running from IQ to the private marginal product of 
labor, then further avenues will need to be explored.   
 
The IQ-augmented Ramsey model 
  While the same results will obtain whether I use a Ramsey or a Solow growth 
model, I use the Ramsey model.  I assume that aside from differences in IQ and A (the 
technology parameter), all countries share the same parameter values.  Assume the 
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(For all Ramsey-related proofs, see, inter alia,  chapter 2 of Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(2004)).  This result implies that the interest rate and the capital per effective labor ratio 
are determined by the model’s deep parameters, ρ, θ, g, and δ.  Combining this result 
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  12  Note that when IQ is higher, steady-state capital per worker is also higher.  This is 
because a rise in IQ causes a higher non-steady-state interest rate, which generates more 
saving.  This in turn generates more capital per worker in the new steady-state.  
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Taking logs, substituting out the technology expression A, and combining constants into 














⎛     (3) 
This is the equation I use to evaluate the impact of IQ differences on steady-state 
living standards.  The γ/(1-α) coefficient captures one unique channel through which IQ 
impacts living standards: by raising the private marginal product of labor and hence 
steady-state productivity.  As noted above, the error term may well be correlated with a 
nation’s IQ, and captures any other channel that could explain IQ’s correlation with 
output per worker.
1   
 
 
                                                 
1Note that since the parameters relating to the steady-state interest rate are assumed to be the same 
across countries, this implies that whether each economy is open or closed to capital flows will have no 
impact on the steady-state capital stock.   
 
  13Data and Parameters 
  Two key parameters are needed for our simple calibration exercise: the semi-
elasticity of wages with respect to IQ, and the elasticity of output with respect to capital.  
I discuss these in order. 
  Labor economists have a rich literature estimating the link between cognitive 
ability and wages.  In most cases, the cognitive ability measure is the Armed Forces 
Qualifying Test (AFQT) given as part of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth.  
The AFQT is the test used to measure of cognitive ability in Murray and Herrnstein’s The 
Bell Curve, in Neal and Johnson (1996), and in Cawley et al. (1997).   
  In the labor economics literature, differences in cognitive ability are usually 
reported as z-scores, that is, as standard deviations away from the mean.  However, in the 
spirit of tying the economics literature closer to the psychology literature, and also to aid 
interpretation when comparing results from different countries, I will make the necessary 
conversions in order to report all cognitive scores in terms of IQ points.     
  As is well known, the mean IQ in the U.S. is typically defined as equal to 100, 
and the standard deviation of I.Q. in the U.S. population is defined as equal to 15.  And 
this standard deviation of 15 holds in practice: For example, when Zax and Rees (2002) 
analyzed an actual IQ test given to citizens of Wisconsin, they found the standard 
deviation of their sample was 15.1.  Thus, γ equals one-fifteenth of the estimated effect of 
a one-standard-deviation rise in cognitive ability on wages.   
  The labor economics literature has used a variety of innovative techniques to 
estimate the impact of a rise in cognitive ability on wages.  Many studies control for a 
wide variety of variables, such as education, age, and sector of employment.  Others use 
  14innovative instruments, such as Neal and Johnson (1996) who used quarter of birth as an 
instrument for exogenous changes in education (and hence, to estimate the effect of 
exogenous changes in education on IQ).  When assessing the vast literature on cognitive 
ability and wages, I put more weight on estimates that have been widely cited and that 
appear to use the best econometric techniques.   
  A crucial question is that of appropriate controls:  As Zax and Rees (2002) 
carefully show, the decision to include education variables in an regression of wages on 
IQ could bias the IQ coefficient downward.  For example, if higher IQ causes more 
education, then some of the IQ coefficient’s true value would be transferred to the 
education coefficient.  Thus, the simplest regressions may well be the best ones for our 
purposes.  This implies that I should place some weight on results from naïve bivariate 
regressions of wages on IQ when trying to estimate the true value of γ.   
  Using a number of controls, Neal and Johnson (1996) estimate γ=1.17, while 
Bishop (1989) estimates γ=1.27.  In regressions that omit non-cognitive control variables, 
Cawley et al. (1997) find a range of estimates across various racial and gender categories, 
ranging from γ =1.3 for black females to γ=1.0 for white males.  When controls are added 
to the Heckman results, the estimates drop by between one-third to one-half.  When Zax 
and Rees omit non-cognitive control variables, their estimates are γ=0.7 for males age 35 
and γ= 1.4 for males in at age 53; they consider these to be upper bounds for the true 
estimate. When Zax and Rees include controls, the estimates drop to 0.3 and 0.7, 
respectively.   
  In one literature survey that looks at 65 estimates of γ without regard to the 
quality of the econometric methodology, Bowles et al (2001) find an average estimate of 
  15γ=0.5 over the past four decades, an estimate that has a wide variance but no substantial 
time trend.  The discovery of no trend provides some reason to believe that γ remains 
relatively stable as nations become richer.  The one exception to their no-trend result is a 
rising trend in γ among African Americans (p.23).   
  The question of whether γ is roughly similar across countries should be briefly 
discussed.  Within the U.S., Cawley et al. (1997) test for and reject the restriction that γ is 
equal across gender and racial groups.  Their finding that white men’s wages are less 
responsive to IQ than any other demographic group (aside from Hispanic men) provides 
some preliminary evidence that the wage-IQ link will be at least as strong in poorer 
countries as it is in the U.S.   
  Behrman et al. (2004) survey the academic literature on estimates of γ from 
various developing countries. They report values for Pakistan (γ≈0.87), Ghana (0.67), 
Kenya (1.07), Tanzania (0.67), Columbia (0.47 to 1.53), and Chile (0.4 to 0.67).  If I 
average the Columbia and Chile estimates to create one estimate per country, then the 
overall mean for these 6 countries is γ≈0.8, with a median of 0.77.   
  I summarize this wide variety of estimates by taking γ=1 as the preferred estimate. 
In part, this is because U.S. estimates using modern methodologies rarely find γ<1, and 
generally find γ>1. This is also because if I average the median developing country 
estimate of γ≈0.8 with the γ≈1.2 found in the U.S. by Neal and Johnson (1996) and 
Bishop (1989), I arrive at an average of γ=1.  As a robustness check, I also consider 
γ=1.25 and γ=0.5 as alternative estimates.
2   
                                                 
2 In a footnote below, I consider the possibility that γ depends on a nation’s level of development.  Such an 
assumption improves the calibration’s fit.   
  16  Now I turn to α, the capital elasticity of output.  A conventional estimate of α 
based on the share of income paid to owners of physical capital would be one-third (inter 
alia, Gollin, 2002).  However, there are good reasons to believe that α is substantially 
larger than that.  A basic result in the growth literature is that α is a key determinant of 
the speech with which an economy converges to its steady-state growth path: The greater 
the α, the more rapidly capital is accumulated, and the greater is the speed of 
convergence.  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, 110, 496) note that countries (as well as 
U.S. states and Japanese prefectures) converge to the steady state growth path much too 
quickly for a value of α as small as one-third.  They find that α=0.75 fits the convergence 
data much better.   
  Such a large value for α could be due to the important role played by the 
accumulation of human capital by way of education, as Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) 
argue.  They find that a human-capital augmented Solow model with a coefficient on 
education-based human capital equal to one-third fits the data well; when they combine 
this with a physical capital elasticity of one-third, this implies an aggregate model where 
α=0.67.   
  By contrast, Parente and Prescott (2000, 2004) argue that the key form of 
“missing capital” is organizational capital.  Investment in organizational capital includes 
activities such as “starting up a new business, learning-on-the-job, training, education, 
research and development, and some forms of advertising” (p. 49; note that education is 
among their forms of missing capital). This unmeasured investment ranges from 35% to 
55% of GDP, according to Parente and Prescott (2004).  In their attempt to match the 
  17rapid catch-up of the East Asian economies, they conclude that “capital share values in 
the range from 0.55 to 0.65 are consistent with the growth miracles” (p. 47).   
   Thus, if I am trying to explain why some countries are richer than others, an 
α=0.33 is likely to miss the important roles of human and organizational capital.  I use 
α=0.33, 0.5, and 0.75, but prefer the latter two estimates.   
  Our data sources should briefly be mentioned.  As noted above, our national 
average IQ estimates are from Lynn and Vanhanen (2002).  Our GDP per worker 
estimates are from the Penn World Tables.  In total, I have complete data for 63 XXX 67 
countries that are broadly representative of the world’s economies.  Data and software are 
available upon request.   
 
Using the Model 
  In this section, I combine the steady state equation of the IQ-augmented Ramsey 
model with conventional parameter values for γ and α to illustrate how IQ differences can 
have a large impact on steady-state living standards.  Consider two countries that differ 
only in average IQ.  The ratio of steady-state living standards in these two countries 
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where ∆IQ is the difference in IQ between the two countries. Lynn and Vanhanen show 
that if countries are ranked according to IQ, then the bottom decile has a median IQ of 66 
and the top decile has a median IQ of 104.  I take γ =1 as our preferred estimate; under 
this assumption a rise of 1 IQ point raises wages (and the marginal product of labor) by a 
modest 1%.   
  18  Therefore, as Figure 2 illustrates, if a country moved from the bottom IQ decile to 
the top IQ decile (a rise of 38 points), steady state living standards would be 1.75 times 
the initial value if α=1/3, and 4.5 times the initial value if α=3/4.  In either case, IQ’s 
impact on steady-state living standards would be too large too ignore.   
  But perhaps our estimates of cross-country IQ differences are exaggerated. If the 
true IQ gap between the top 10% and the bottom 10% is only half of Lynn and 
Vanhanen’s estimate--19 points--then a move from bottom to top would imply a rise in 
steady state living standards of between 33% and 110%, depending on the value of α.   
  The implications are clear: If Lynn and Vanhanen are correct in concluding that 
IQ differences across countries are substantial, and if labor economists are correct in 
believing that higher IQ raises the marginal product of labor, then the IQ-augmented 
Ramsey model implies that IQ is an important determinant of cross-country income 
differences. This result holds even if one believes that Lynn and Vanhanen’s dataset 
inaccurately measures national average IQ for particular countries: Large between-
country IQ differences are all that is needed to reach this result.  Whether the role of IQ is 
overwhelming or merely substantial turns on the preferred value of α.   
  I should note the results in this section do not depend on IQ being exogenous.  I 
demonstrate below that reverse causality is unlikely to be the main explanation for the 
strong empirical IQ-productivity relationship.  However, even if reverse causality were 
important, the above results would still hold, since microeconomic studies demonstrate 
convincingly that IQ has an independent impact on the marginal product of labor.   
  So if the actual causal chain starts with a high level of disembodied technology 
(A) causing higher output per worker, which in turn causes higher IQ, it is difficult to 
  19believe that the causal chain stops there.  According to economic theory, the chain 
continues to a second set of links, where higher IQ-workers cause more productivity and 
hence cause a higher steady-state capital stock.  This paper is concerned only with that 




  Our calibration exercise is quite straightforward: In a regression of log output per 
worker on IQ, I impose a variety of estimates for the γ/(1-α) coefficient, and I report the 
accompanying R
2
.  The resulting R
2 is the percentage of cross-country income variance 
that can be explained through a single channel: the steady-state impact of mean IQ 
differences on the marginal product of labor.   
  The only coefficient estimated in this regression is the constant; there are no free 
parameters to speak of.  For reference, I note that the R
2 between log GDP per worker in 
2000 and Lynn and Vanhanen’s national average IQ estimate is 64%, and in an OLS 
regression, 1 IQ point is associated with 7.2% higher GDP per worker.   
Results are reported in Table 1.
3  For our preferred estimate of γ=1.0, IQ can 
explain between 24 and 52 percent of cross-country income variation depending on the 
choice of α.  Therefore, IQ’s impact on wages would explain between 38% (i.e., 
24%/64%) and 81% of the relationship between IQ and living standards.  
  If, instead, IQ has a 25% larger impact on wages (γ=1.25), and if Barro and Sala-
i-Martin are correct in their estimate of the “broad capital” share (α=.75), then IQ’s effect 
                                                 
3 Results were substantially unchanged if 2000 log GDP per person was used instead of log GDP per 
worker.  
  20on wages can explain 91% (=58%/64%) of the IQ/living standards relationship. In such a 
case, there would be little need to invoke human capital externalities, reverse causation, 
or other factors in explaining the strong relationship between IQ and GDP per worker.   
  And even if γ=0.5--half of our preferred estimate--IQ’s impact on wages explains 
at least one-eighth and certainly more than one-fourth of cross-country income variation.  
So even under the most restrictive assumptions, IQ’s impact on wages appears to belong 
on any top ten list of explanations for cross-country income differences.
4  
  Note that in each of these cases, the coefficient γ/(1-α) is always less than the 7.2 
that would occur in an OLS regression; for example, in  the γ=1 case, the relevant values 
for α=1/3, 1/2, and 3/4,  are 1.33, 2, and 4, respectively.  Therefore, in no case does the 
IQ-augmented Ramsey model overpredict the relationship between IQ and steady-state 
productivity per worker: more remains to be explained.  We now turn to one possible 
explanation. 
 
                                                 
4 I also considered the possibility that a nation’s γ rises as that nation’s national average IQ rises.  This 
would be the case, if, for instance, countries are better at sorting workers into more-productive jobs as the 
national average IQ rises.  In particular, I considered the following functional form: γ = 0.8 + 0.0133(IQ-
70).  This would be the appropriate form if moving from the bottom to the top of the global distribution of 
IQ raised gamma from 0.8 to 1.2, and is equivalent to adding a quadratic term to the linear model of 
equation (3).  The 0.8 value is the mean γ for developing countries, while the 1.2 value is close to many of 
the U.S. estimates noted in the text.   
  Such a model fits the data better than the results reported here.  In the case of year 2000 GDP per 
worker, values of α=1/3, 1/2, and 3/4 explain 44%, 54%, and 63%, respectively, of the variance in the 
global income distribution.  This improved fit is robust to changes in the intercepts of the γ equation.  The 
improved fit is not surprising, but it is not tautological.  It is not surprising since this endogenous γ equation 
will tend to depress estimated steady-state productivity in lower-IQ countries and raise it in higher-IQ 
countries--thus widening the global income distribution.  And as noted in the text, the model implied by 
equation (3) underpredicts the empirical relationship between IQ and living standards.  But the improved fit 
is not tautological: Since there are no free parameters to speak of in the calibration exercises, adding a 
quadratic term to the calibration will not necessarily improve the model’s fit.   
  Despite the improved fit that results from endogenizing γ in this way, I choose to impose a single 
value for γ.  I do so largely because the growth and labor literatures have, to my knowledge, done no 
theoretical or empirical work on the appropriate functional form for γ.  Since I intend to remain close to the 
mainstream of these literatures, I leave the question of γ’s functional form to future research.  
 
  21Addressing Reverse Causality 
  As the previous section demonstrates, if α is set equal to Barro and Sala-i-
Martin’s preferred value of 0.75, and γ is equal to (or even slightly less than) the 
preferred values of Neal and Johnson or Bishop, then the IQ-wage channel (in steady-
state) appears to be able to explain the vast majority of the IQ-productivity relationship.  
In such a case, there is little need to invoke reverse causality, human capital spillovers, or 
the effect of IQ on technological innovation to explain the correlation of 0.74 between IQ 
and log output per worker.   
  But perhaps the true values of α and γ are smaller: in such a case, there could be 
an important role for these other channels.  While I leave most of these questions to 
future research, I will take a moment to address one key question: Whether a dramatic 
rise in GDP per worker causes a dramatic rise in national average IQ.   
The region of the world that has witnessed the most rapid increases in living 
standards the world has ever known is unambiguously East Asia.  Surely, this region 
would be an ideal testing ground for the productivity-causes-IQ hypothesis.  If most of 
the IQ-productivity relationship were reverse causality, then I would expect to see the 
East Asian economies starting off with low IQ’s in the middle of the 20
th century, IQ’s 
that would rapidly rise in later decades, perhaps even converging to European IQ levels.   
  But what would I expect the mid-20
th-century starting point for IQ to be?  Perhaps 
I should assume that it would be as low as the bottom decile of the global IQ distribution 
which has a mean of 66, as noted above.  That would place such countries more than two 
standard deviations below the mean IQ within the United States.  Or perhaps that 
assumption is too strong; at the very least, I would expect these poor East Asian 
  22economies to have started off with IQ’s below the unweighted global mean of 90, and 
certainly well below the U.K and U.S., which are within a point or two of 100.   
  However, this is not the case.  When Sailer (2004) employs Lynn and Vanhanen’s 
raw IQ data--based on 183 tests taken over the past 100 years--to create a panel dataset, 
he reports that average East Asian IQ’s were never estimated below 100 before the 
1980’s (Figure 3).  From the 1950’s and 60’s, for example, Lynn and Vanhanen have four 
IQ tests based on relatively large samples: Two from Japan (1951 and 1967), one from 
Taiwan (1956, only a few years after the Nationalists were driven there from the 
mainland), and one from Hong Kong (1968).   
  Lynn and Vanahen’s data from rapidly growing economies in Southeast Asia, 
though based on only five observations, support a similar conclusion:    
Indonesia, 1959:       IQ = 89 
Phillipines, 1970:       IQ= 86 
Singapore, 1974:       IQ = 103 
Thailand, 1987:       IQ = 91 
Malaysia, 1992:       IQ = 92 
Average IQ’s start about ten points lower than in East Asia, but also end about ten points 
lower.  There have apparently been no twenty-to-thirty-point IQ increases in Southeast 
Asia as these countries began to emerge from dire poverty.
5  
But IQ increases do occur on a national scale.  Indeed, there is a large literature in 
psychology that studies the rise in IQ’s across the developed world, a rise of roughly two 
to three points per decade across most of the 20
th century.  This phenomenon is known as 
the Flynn effect (after Flynn (1987)), and it has been widely studied and widely debated.  
Explanations that psychologists have considered for the Flynn effect include better 
                                                 
5 The reader interested in further exploring changes in IQ scores over time for a particular country or region 
is urged to consult Appendix 2 of Lynn and Vanhanen (2002) or Sailer’s (2004) online spreadsheet.   
  23nutrition, better education, and educational television, as well as the possibility that the 
Flynn effect is merely a “nominal” rise in narrow test-taking ability with little impact on 
“real” general reasoning and information processing abilities. For helpful reviews of the 
Flynn effect literature, Neisser (1998) and Jensen (1998, 318-333) are highly 
recommended.
6   
Unfortunately, economists have not yet brought their powerful econometric tools 
to bear on the question of what causes the Flynn effect, either within the U.S. or in other 
countries.  As economists come to recognize the importance of IQ differences for 
determining living standards, one can only hope that they will devote substantial 
resources to determining what causes the Flynn effect within the developed world, as 
well as whether policy interventions can set off even larger Flynn effects in the world’s 
poorest countries.  If economists can collaborate with policymakers to initiate a process 
of global IQ convergence, they will have removed one of the most substantial barriers to 
riches.  
 
IQ and Productivity, 1960-1990 
One question of interest is whether the IQ-productivity relationship has 
strengthened or weakened over the past few decades.  Shocks such as the Great 
Depression and the Second World War were likely to move nations away from their 
steady-state paths; accordingly, one would expect the IQ-productivity relationship to 
have strengthened since then.   
As Table 2 shows, I indeed found this to be the case.  I used LV’s IQ data along 
with Penn World Table data for each decade from 1960 through 1990 (1950 only had 38 
                                                 
6 For evidence of a large Flynn effect in rural Kenya in recent decades, see Daley et. al (2003).   
  24relevant observations, and so is omitted).  As before, equation (3) was used to estimate 
the IQ-productivity relationship, while the IQ-elasticity of wages is assumed to equal 1 
for simplicity.  Both the unconditional R
2 and the fraction of the variance explained by 
the IQ-wage relationship increase steadily across the decades.  This is true regardless of 
the capital share parameter in question.  
This increasing relevance of IQ could be due to a number of factors.  Perhaps as 
other differences across countries diminish—as market-oriented institutions take hold and 
as knowledge of science, technology, and management methods diffuse across 
countries—then IQ differences have become increasingly important.  Another possibility 
is that modern economies depend much more on cognitive ability than they once did.  
The simplest possibility would be the one with which I began this section: that the crises 
of the early and middle 20
th century pushed many nations away from their steady-state 
growth paths, paths toward which they are approaching every year.   
 
 
IQ as a Missing Input 
  Based on IQ’s power to explain such a large portion of cross-country income 
differences, it would be reasonable to conclude that IQ is one of the “missing inputs” that 
Caselli (2004), Easterly (2004), and other growth researchers are looking for.  Caselli, for 
example, considers the possibility that what he calls “schooling quality”—a combination 
of standardized test scores broadly comparable to IQ—may be a key missing input.  
However, the conclusions he can draw are limited by the existence of relevant math, 
science, and reading scores from only 28 countries.   
  25  IQ data, by contrast, are much more widely available: Lynn and Vanhanen’s data 
cover 81 countries, and IQ measures have the benefit of a massive international literature 
linking cognitive ability to wage outcomes.   Further, there is a rich clinical and academic 
literature within psychology devoted to making scores from different types of IQ tests 
comparable.  And as Jones and Schneider (2004) demonstrate in their consideration of the 
Barro-Lee (1993) and Hanushek-Kimko (2000) data on cross-country standardized test 
scores, such scores are quite strongly correlated with IQ scores, and are likely to be 
measuring many (though not all) of the same productive mental skills that IQ tests 
measure.   
As an empirical matter, then, the merits of considering IQ as a “missing input” are 
clear: Widely available data combined with large literatures in labor econometrics and 
empirical psychology on which growth economists can draw.  But what of the possible 
role for IQ in growth theory?  Here, one can not only point to the IQ-augmented Ramsey 
model presented here; one can also consider the possibility of a new theoretical literature 
that spells out the ability (or lack thereof) of IQ to explain productivity levels as well as 
productivity growth rates.   
The Ramsey-style model of Manuelli and Seshadri would be a natural example: In 
their model, ex-ante differences in total factor productivity of at most 27% interact with 
human capital investment decisions and fertility choices to replicate the current global 
income distribution.  Persistent IQ differences would be a natural source for such ex-ante 
differences in total factor productivity.  Indeed, the current span of global IQ 
  26differences—38 points between the bottom and top IQ deciles—creates a TFP gap that is  
almost double the amount needed in their model.
7   
As an additional example: Warner and Pleeter (2001) find that higher cognitive 
ability is associated with lower discount rates.  If these results generalize across 
countries, then IQ may impact steady-state capital accumulation through yet another 
channel: via country-specific differences in discount rates.
8  And the possible links 
between national average IQ and technology innovation and adoption are too obvious to 
belabor.   
One can multiply examples, but the point is clear: stylized facts related to IQ and 
productivity are ready and waiting for the theorist who seeks to explain a large part of the 
puzzle of cross-country productivity differences.  Accordingly, IQ may play an important 
role in answering Prescott’s (1998) call for a theory of total factor productivity.  
 
Conclusion 
  The wide divergence we see in living standards across countries is not a puzzle: 
This divergence is precisely what quantitative general equilibrium theory predicts as long 
as there are large, persistent differences in general reasoning ability across countries.   
  However, the differences in living standards we see in the real world are even 
larger than the differences predicted by the IQ-augmented Ramsey model.  According to 
the model presented here, countries in the top IQ decile should be, at most, 4.5 times 
                                                 
7 Note that if γ=1, then exp(.01*38)=1.46; so a 38-point IQ gap would cause a 46 percent TFP gap.   
8 Indeed, persistent cross-country differences in average cognitive ability could provide a solution to the 
Feldstein-Horioka (1980) international savings puzzle: High-IQ countries would be both more productive 
(hence creating a higher demand for investment goods) and more patient (hence creating more private 
savings with which to meet that demand).  Experimental findings of the strong relationship between 
cognitive ability and patience can be found in Benjamin and Shapiro (2005).   
  27more productive than countries in the lowest IQ decile.  However, productivity between 
such countries instead differs by a factor of roughly 20.  Another way to phrase this result 
is that if the IQ-wage channel were the only important mechanism driving cross-country 
income differences, then if today’s rich countries are taken to be at the technological 
frontier, then no country today would be less productive than Thailand, Bulgaria, 
Guatemala, or Morocco.    
Therefore, the desperate poverty of the world’s poorest countries is not explained 
by this model.  Indeed, this model makes no claim to being a complete explanation of 
cross-country differences in living standards.  Recall that if one IQ point raises wages by 
roughly one percent, as many labor economists claim, then this model explains between 
26% and 56% of the cross-country variance in output per worker.  This means that much 
remains to be explained by factors such as political institutions, colonial experience 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001)), innovation policy, and many other non-
cognitive factors.   
  But with that crucial caveat, I close by noting that this paper has uncovered an 
explanation for productivity differences that has been left entirely unexplored in the 
literature: the steady-state impact of persistent differences in cognitive ability on the 
marginal product of labor.   
  What else have I left unexplained?  I have not explained the entire correlation of 
0.80 between IQ and worker productivity.  Perhaps human capital externalities and 
feedback effects from worker productivity to IQ are part of the story.  Indeed, any non-
wage explanation for the IQ-productivity link remains open for exploration.   
  28  More importantly, I have not attempted to explain why IQ diverges so much 
across countries--and diverges even across poor countries.  In this respect, these results 
are similar to those of Kydland and Prescott (1982), who showed that well-documented 
differences in productivity across time could explain a large fraction of the variance of 
output.  Similarly, I have shown that well-documented differences in IQ across countries 
can explain a large fraction of the variance of output.  And just as Kydland and Prescott 
left the investigation of the causes of productivity fluctuations to future research, I leave 
the investigation of the causes of persistent IQ differences to future research.   
  I hope that economists can bring their powerful econometric tools to bear on the 
question of why IQ gaps across poor countries are so large.  If economists can find ways 
to close these persistent IQ gaps, the world’s poorest citizens may be able to make full 
use of their productive potential.  If growth economists instead avoid studying differences 
in national average IQ, the results presented here imply that they may be missing more 
than half the story.   
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Notes: Y-axis shows GDP per worker in logarithmic scale.  In this bivariate regression, 
the coefficient on national average IQ is 0.072, and the R
2 is 64%.  Thus, a one-point rise 
in IQ is associated with 7.2% higher output per worker.  The outlier in the lower-right 
corner is China.   
 
Source: Lynn and Vanhanen (2002) and Penn World Tables 6.1 for IQ and GDP data, 
respectively.   
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lo, the ratio of steady-state living 
standards in two countries who differ only in national average IQ.  This chart is based on 
equation (4) in the text under the assumption that γ, the semi-elasticity of wages with 
respect to IQ, equals 1.  α is the capital elasticity of output.   
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Source: Lynn and Vanhanen (2002), as reported in Sailer (2004).
  32Table 1: Productivity variance explained by IQ’s impact on wages 
 
  γ=0.5  γ=1.0  γ=1.25 
α=.33  13% 24%  29% 
α=.5  17% 31%  37% 
α=.75  31% 52%  58% 
 
Notes: γ is the semi-elasticity of output with respect to IQ, and α the capital elasticity of 
output.  The percentages indicate the variance in year 2000 GDP per worker that can be 
explained by IQ’s steady-state impact on the private marginal product of labor, as set 
forth in equation (3).  For reference, the R
2 from simple regression of year 2000 log GDP 
per worker on national average IQ is 64%.  IQ and GDP data are from Figure 1.  
  33Table 2: Productivity variance explained by IQ’s impact on wages, 1960-1990 
  1960 1970 1980 1990 
α=.33  19% 21% 22% 24% 
α=.5  24% 27% 28% 31% 
α=.75  38% 43% 46% 52% 
R
2 40% 48% 54% 65% 
N 60 62 63 66 
 
Notes: γ, the semi-elasticity of output with respect to IQ, is assumed to be 1, and α is the 
capital elasticity of output.  The percentages indicate the variance in the year’s GDP per 
worker that can be explained by IQ’s steady-state impact on the private marginal product 
of labor, as set forth in equation (3).  For reference, the R
2 from simple regression of the 
year’s log GDP per worker on national average IQ is also reported.  GDP data is from the 
Penn World Tables.  
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